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ARTICLES
GREENPEACE V. NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE:
STELLER SEA LIONS AND
COMMERCIAL FISHERIES IN THE
NORTH PACIFIC
JERRY MCBEATH*
The waters off of Alaska hold one of the richest fisheries in the
world.  However, it is also home to the Steller sea lion, a large ma-
rine mammal whose numbers have declined precipitously in the
last several decades.  The Steller sea lion was listed as an endan-
gered species in 1990.  Despite this action, fishing continues to en-
croach on the animal’s habitat which environmentalists argue is a
major reason for their decline.  As a result, in 1998, Greenpeace
and a number of other environmental organizations brought suit
challenging the agency regulations governing the fisheries en-
croaching on the Stellar sea lions’ habitat.  In litigation spanning
six years and four trials before the District Court for the Western
District of Washington, while faced with intervenors spanning
various interests in the fishing industry, Greenpeace eventually
succeeded in shaping agency policy to better suit the needs of the
endangered mammal.
I.  INTRODUCTION
This article examines a specific instance of the use of science in
developing governmental protection for an endangered species.  It
concerns the series of litigation entitled Greenpeace v. National
Marine Fisheries Service,1 presenting a conservationist challenge to
Copyright © 2004 by Jerry McBeath.  This Article is also available on the Internet
at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/21ALRMcBeath.
* B.A., University of Chicago, 1963; M.A., University of Chicago, 1964; Ph.D.
(Political Science), University of California, Berkeley, 1970; Professor of Political
Science, University of Alaska Fairbanks. This article is based on the paper “Willy-
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agency protection of Steller sea lions. The Greenpeace decisions
did not establish new law via judicial interpretation of existing en-
dangered species law.  Rather, the decisions applied the pioneering
statutes of the American environmental protection movement to
the complex issues of a complex fishery.  By doing so, this case has
established a precedent that will likely be used to evaluate future
challenges to biodiversity in the North Pacific ecosystem.
The Steller sea lion (“SSL”) is a marine mammal estimated to
have originated between three and four million years ago.2  The
vast North Pacific ecosystem, including the Bering Sea/Aleutian
Islands and Gulf of Alaska waters, make up the SSL’s natural habi-
tat.3  The world’s largest population of SSL occupies the North Pa-
cific.4  While in the 1950s that population numbered in excess of
240,000, the species declined by almost ninety percent in the 1970s.5
Nilly Zilly?  How the Court Rules the Oceans (and Steller Sea Lions)” presented
to the Western Regional Science Association conference in February, 2003.  It
presents research in the project “Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: Manage-
ment of Commercial Fisheries and Marine Mammals,” partially funded by the
Cooperative Institute for Arctic Research, under NOAA Cooperative Agreement
no. NA 17RJ1224.  I thank the funding agency but hold it harmless from errors of
analysis and conclusions drawn in this paper.  I also thank the court clerks, West-
ern District of Washington (Seattle), for assistance in locating materials in the
Greenpeace v. NMFS dockets (#C98-0492Z) from the time of the filing of the case
in 1998 through June 2003.  Graduate research assistant Ronald “Burr” Neely as-
sisted this research by preparing under my direction “Steller Sea Lion Crisis: A
Chronology.”  A number of participants in the SSL controversy reviewed the con-
ference paper and provided me with constructive criticism, including Timothy
Ragen, Lowell Fritz, Tamra Fairis, Jonathan Pollard, Jack Sterne, Melanie Brown,
Michael Payne, Brent Paine, Eric Jorgensen, Peter Jones, Beverly Li, Janis Sear-
les, and Paul MacGregor.  Three colleagues, Sue Hills, Sheila Fellerath, and Ian
Urquhart, also reviewed the paper.  I thank them all for their insights and sugges-
tions, but am solely responsible for remaining errors and omissions.  I would also
like to acknowledge the work of the editors,  particularly their work on the cita-
tions.
1. Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (W.D.
Wash. 2002) [hereinafter “Greenpeace IV”]; Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisher-
ies Serv., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2000) [hereinafter “Greenpeace III”];
Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D. Wash.
2000) [hereinafter “Greenpeace II”]; Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999) [hereinafter “Greenpeace I”].
2. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECLINE OF THE STELLER SEA LION IN
ALASKAN WATERS 6 (2003); see also Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (dis-
cussing the history and current status of the SSL).
3. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
4. Id.
5. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1.
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As a result, in 1990,  the species was listed under the U.S. Endan-
gered Species Act (“ESA”)6 as threatened.  Moreover, in 1997, the
western stock of SSL, whose numbers have declined more radically
than the eastern population, which is actually now increasing
slightly, was listed as endangered in 1997.7
Marine scientists propose several hypotheses to explain the
decline of the SSL population including: (1) nutritional stress, i.e.,
competition between SSL and fisheries for prey; (2) climate shift;
(3) predators, e.g., killer whales; (4) contaminants; (5) disease; (6)
incidental take by fishermen; and (7) hunting by Alaska Natives.8
However, no definitive cause of SSL decline has been established.
Nonetheless, it has been determined that the decline coincides with
development and growth of industrialized groundfish fisheries,
which target the same prey species that SSL principally use for sur-
vival—pollock, Atka mackerel, and Pacific cod.  During the 1980s
and 1990s, these fisheries, which collectively harvested more than
four-billion pounds of fish annually,9 became increasingly concen-
trated in the critical habitat designated for the endangered SSL’s
western population.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), an office of
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration in
the U.S. Department of Commerce, is the federal agency responsi-
ble both for managing the groundfish fishery and for protecting the
SSL.10  In 1998, Greenpeace, American Oceans Campaign, and the
Sierra Club accused NMFS of failing to prevent jeopardy to the
SSL and failing to protect its critical habitat.11  They brought a civil
action against NMFS in the U.S. District Court for the Western
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
7. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (“Based on continued population
declines, in 1997 NMFS classified the Steller sea lion into two distinct population
segments east and west of 144 W longitude and reclassified the western population
as endangered.”); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL supra note 2, at 1 (discuss-
ing the different population trajectories of the eastern and western populations).
8. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3.
9. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
GROUNDFISH TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH SPECIFICATION AND PROHIBITED
SPECIES CATCH LIMITS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT
PLANS FOR THE GROUNDFISH FISHERY OF THE BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN
ISLANDS AREA AND GROUNDFISH OF THE GULF OF ALASKA: FINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 44 (1998).
10. National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA Fisheries: About National Ma-
rine Fisheries, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/what.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2004).
11. Complaint at 1-3, Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(No. C98-0492Z).
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District of Washington.12  Greenpeace challenged the agency’s
biological opinions in evaluating the interactions between these in-
dustrialized fisheries and the declining SSL population.13  This
challenge effectively made the federal court, and Judge Thomas S.
Zilly, the arbiter of fishery policy.
This article proceeds in three parts.  First, it identifies the rele-
vant endangered species law and agencies regulating fisheries man-
agement and the SSL habitat.  Second, it examines the key aspects
of the Greenpeace litigation: protesters who challenged manage-
ment of the North Pacific fisheries, the interests they seek to pro-
tect, the authorities their challenge implicated, and the specific is-
sues arising from their challenge.  It also discusses the parties
whose interests have been served by the status quo and who inter-
vened in the legal challenges, as well as the specific issues arising
from the defense of the fisheries.  Third, the article examines how
Judge Zilly made his quartet of decisions: Greenpeace v. NMFS
(hereinafter “Greenpeace I”) 14 in 1999, Greenpeace v. NMFS
(hereinafter “Greenpeace II”)15 in January 2000, Greenpeace v.
NMFS (hereinafter “Greenpeace III”)16 in July 2000, and Green-
peace v. NMFS (hereinafter “Greenpeace IV”)17 in December 2002.
Examining the evidence presented in the cases and the factors most
influential in shaping Judge Zilly’s decisions casts light on the
status of marine mammal conservation in the North Pacific.
II.  GOVERNANCE OF THE FISHERIES
In many respects, the Steller sea lion case is representative of
recent national and global campaigns to protect biodiversity.18  This
endangered species is an ancient mega-fauna, whose elimination
would threaten not only ecosystem diversity, but also important
symbolic values.  The apparent human threat to the species is the
efficient groundfish trawl fishery, with an annual business volume
in excess of $1 billion.19  Those defending the species are environ-
12. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
13. Id. at 1253.
14. Id.
15. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
16. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
17. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
18. Alvin L. Alm, NEPA: Past, Present and Future, EPA J. (Jan./Feb. 1988),
available at www.epa.gov/history/topics/nepa/01.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
19. Terry Hiatt et al., Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation Report for
the Groundfish Fisheries of the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea/Aleutian Island
Area: Economic Status of the Groundfish Fisheries Off Alaska, 2002 56 (2003),
available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/docs/2003/economic.pdf (last visited
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mental organizations with local and global connections, which
campaign persuasively for a sustainable and ecologically diverse fu-
ture.
A. Federal Legislation
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)20 was the
first comprehensive environmental legislation enacted in the
United States.21  At its heart, it requires that before any major fed-
eral action is taken that would significantly affect the quality of the
environment, an environmental impact statement must be com-
pleted.22  The impact statement must comprehensively examine po-
tential effects of the action on the environment and clearly specify
alternatives, with their environmental effects.23  Courts have
treated NEPA as procedural legislation and typically have not re-
quired federal agencies to produce specific substantive outcomes,
so long as alternatives are carefully considered.24  NEPA was one
subject of the Greenpeace challenge because NMFS authorizes
fisheries in the federal waters of the North Pacific,25 and these fish-
eries have adverse environmental effects.  Greenpeace specifically
cited NMFS for violating NEPA by not preparing a comprehensive
supplemental environmental impact statement nearly twenty years
following its initial impact statements in 1978 and 1981, while the
fishery and environment had experienced significant transforma-
tions.26
The most significant legislation affecting the management of
the SSL is the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).27  Con-
gress enacted ESA
to provide a means whereby ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered spe-
cies and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be ap-
Feb. 21, 2004).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000).
21. Id. §§ 4321, 4331.
22. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
23. Id.
24. See ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PARADOX 65
(2004).
25. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN THE NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICES 9 (2002).
26. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 27-31, Greenpeace I (W.D. Wash. 1999) (No. 98-0492-C).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
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propriate to achieve the purposes of treaties and conventions set
forth in subsection (a) of this section.28
ESA outlines a management process to provide for listing and pro-
tection of threatened and endangered species,29 which begins with
an individual or group petition to the relevant agency.30
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, the
agency organizes a recovery team and develops a recovery plan to
outline the potential causes of population decline with recommen-
dations to promote species recovery.31  Section 4(3) of ESA re-
quires that a “critical habitat” be designated within one year of the
listing,32 defining “critical habitat” as “the specific areas within the
geographic area occupied by the species [that is] . . . essential to the
conservation of the species and [that] may require special man-
agement considerations or protection.”33  It may include an area
that is not currently occupied by a species, but that will be needed
for its recovery.34  After a critical habitat has been designated,
which occurred for the SSL in 1993,35 more restrictive management
regulations may be required to reduce adverse impacts to the spe-
cies.
The most powerful section of ESA is section 7, which calls for
consultation by federal agencies to ensure that “any action author-
ized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species . . . or re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of [its] habitat.”36  If
a proposed action, for example authorizing a groundfishery to op-
erate in any area of SSL decline, threatens the species, the action
must be modified.  If harm to the species or adverse modification
28. § 1531(b).
29. Lowell W. Fritz et al., The Threatened Status of Steller Sea Lions, Eumeto-
pias jubatus, under the Endangered Species Act, 2 MARINE FISHERIES REV. 14, 16
(1995).
30. The NMFS acts for most marine species and the Fish & Wildlife Service
for terrestrial ones.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 10; NAT’L
ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., COURTS, CONGRESS AND CONSTITUENCIES 44 (2002).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
32. § 1533 (enumerating procedures for determining when a species is endan-
gered and declaring a critical habitat).
33. § 1532(5)(A)(i)-(ii); see also 50 C.F.R. § 226.202 (2003); Greenpeace III,
106 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (W.D. Wash. 2000 )(citing 58 Fed. Reg. 45,269 (Aug.
27, 1993)).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (5)(A).
35. Fritz, supra note 29, at 16.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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to its critical habitat cannot be avoided, the agency must consider
mitigating alternatives or even abandon the action. 37
Section 7 provides for a consultation process to define pro-
posed actions regarding the species, to identify and involve affected
interests, and to design attempts to mitigate adverse effects to the
species.38  In the case of NMFS, the agency consults with itself.39
Significantly, decisions in the consultation process must be based
on the “best scientific and commercial data available,”40 and not on
the grounds of the economic or other interests affected.
The final result of a formal consultation process is a biological
opinion (“BiOp”) that indicates whether a species is in jeopardy.41
The authority issuing BiOps for the SSL in the Gulf of Alaska and
Bering Sea/Aleutian Island fisheries is the Alaska Region of
NMFS.  Recently, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
(“Council”)42 has been involved in the review of biological opin-
37. Fritz, supra note 29, at 16-17.
38. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 30, at 32-33.
39. Section 7 of the ESA requires that
when an action may affect a listed species or its critical habitat,
the federal agency conducting or authorizing that action (the ac-
tion agency) must consult with the federal agency charged with
overseeing recovery efforts for the listed species (the expert
agency).  In cases where a federally managed fishery may inter-
fere with the survival or recovery of certain marine mammals
(seals, sea lions, porpoises, and whales), NMFS is both the ac-
tion and the expert agency.  These responsibilities are segre-
gated within NMFS between the Office of Sustainable Fisheries,
which has the responsibility for reviewing the fishery manage-
ment plans, and the Office of Protected Resources, which has
responsibility for implementing ESA regulations for listed spe-
cies under its jurisdiction.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 20.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2).
41. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 20.
42. The regional council for the North Pacific is called the North Pacific Fish-
ery Management Council, and it covers the largest area of the eight federal re-
gional councils.  16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(G).  The Council has eleven voting members,
five of whom are from Alaska.  Id.  Seven members are appointed by the Secre-
tary of Commerce.  Id.  Throughout the ensuing court proceedings, the Plaintiffs
alleged that the Council had a pro-industry bias, perhaps influencing the actions of
NMFS. Plaintiff Response to Industry-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (No. 98-0492Z).  The
majority of Council members have alliances with the fishing industry.  Leah R.
Gerber, Endangered Species Act Decision Making in the Face of Scientific Uncer-
tainty 31-38 (1993) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington).  The
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ions.43  If the agency makes a finding that a species is in jeopardy or
that adverse modification to its habitat will occur, it must issue a
“reasonable and prudent alternative,” if one is available, which
provides protection for the species, prior to any further federal ac-
tion.44  Moreover, the process may be challenged in federal court
with regard to whether a finding of “no jeopardy” or “jeopardy”
was proper.45
The Administrative Procedure Act46 outlines the procedures
under which actions of administrative agencies, such as NMFS, may
be challenged in federal court.47  Allegations of illegal conduct by
agencies customarily are filed in a federal district court, and the
judge employs the administrative record of the agency to make a
determination as to the legality of such actions.48  Although district
courts are trial bodies, the determination is based on the record
and is not a de novo proceeding.49  Thus, the judicial proceeding is
not based on canons of scientific investigation, experimentation, or
certainty.  Instead, judges merely ask whether the administrative
record supports the complaint of illegal agency action.  If the
agency action does not conform to the judge’s interpretation of the
law, the action is ruled “arbitrary and capricious” and is remanded
to the agency for correction.50
The plaintiffs in Greenpeace I challenged management of the
groundfish fisheries in the North Pacific because they believed that
agency actions had jeopardized the SSL and had adversely modi-
fied the species’ critical habitat.51  The plaintiff’s list of complaints
included the following allegations: (1) the agency had not com-
pleted a comprehensive environmental impact statement, as re-
quired by NEPA; (2) the agency had not determined the cumula-
tive impact of the changes in fisheries over time and their
Council’s prime function is to issue and amend fishery management plans, on the
advice of NMFS.  16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1).
43. Minutes, North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) Meeting 3
(Jan. 2001).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).
45. The Statute gives legal standing to any person who “may commence a civil
suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States . . .
who is alleged to be in violation” of the ESA.  Id. § 1540(g).
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000).
47. Id.
48. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment at 14, Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (Civ. No.
C98-0492Z).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
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interactive effects on SSL; (3) NMFS had failed to provide protec-
tion for SSL in their foraging areas; (4) NMFS had allowed in-
creased fish harvesting from SSL critical habitat; (5) NMFS had not
taken into account significant increases in localized depletion of
fish serving as prey for SSL; (6) NMFS had not imposed adequate
time and space limitation on the fisheries; and (7) NMFS’s prac-
tices overall did not rationally follow the best scientific evidence
available, most of which agency scientists had collected.52
B. Regulatory Regime
The National Marine Fisheries Service is the primary manager
of the fisheries of the North Pacific.  This agency has conflicting
missions: the development of a sustainable fishery industry and the
protection of marine animals.53  Moreover, NMFS’s mission in fish-
eries development and management brings it into close association
with the fishing industry and exposes the agency to criticism that
the economic interests it regulates dictates its actions.
Two laws provide most of the management authority for fish-
eries in federal waters: the Marine Mammal Protection Act54 and
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.55  Be-
fore the population of SSL noticeably declined, Congress estab-
lished a complex regime for managing marine mammals and their
interaction with fisheries.  The first law was the Marine Mammal
Protection Act,56 passed by Congress in 1972.  The purpose of the
Act was to maintain or restore marine mammal populations in fed-
eral waters to healthy levels by prohibiting the killing, hunting, or
harassment of any marine mammal, irrespective of population
size.57  Under this Act, NMFS became the government agency re-
sponsible for managing most marine mammals, such as the SSL.58
Specifically, the agency must develop plans to govern interactions
52. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 27-45, Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (Civ. No. 98-0492-
Z).
53. See infra discussion outlining its authority in the development of a sustain-
able fishery in opposition to the responsibilities it has with respect to conservation
of marine mammals.
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371–1377 (2000).
55. § 1801.
56. See § 1361.
57. Fritz, supra note 29, at 15–16; see also NOAA Office of Legislative Affairs,
Oceans and Great Lakes (last updated May 29, 2003), at
http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/legislation/oceansand greatlakeshouse.html
(outlining laws related to management of marine mammals in the U.S.).
58. Fritz, supra note 29, at 16.
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between commercial fisheries and marine mammals, including is-
suing commercial fisheries permits to allow for the “incidental
take” of marine mammals during normal fishing operations.59
The primary legislative authority for managing the North Pa-
cific fisheries developed four years later.  In 1976, Congress passed
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act,60 later
amended as the Magnuson-Stevens Act (“MSA”).61  The Act’s ob-
jectives included elimination of foreign competition from the two-
hundred nautical mile coastal zone of the U.S. and stimulation of a
domestic fishing industry.62  The Exclusive Economic Zone covers
about nine-hundred thousand square miles of waters off Alaska’s
coast, and it is operated and managed under the authority of the
Department of Commerce, the National Oceanographic and At-
mospheric Administration, and NMFS.63  In the MSA, Congress
provided for the management of U.S. fisheries by establishing eight
regional fishery management councils that work with NMFS to de-
velop fishery management plans with the objective of developing
sustainable fisheries.64  Among other things, the fishery manage-
ment plans are implemented by regulations that limit: (1) take by
establishing total allowable catch ceilings to enhance sustainable
fisheries;65  and (2) set quotas.  The formulation of these mecha-
nisms are all “actions” adopted by NMFS and must follow all ap-
plicable laws including NEPA and ESA section 7 consultation pro-
visions.66
III.  CHALLENGES TO THE FISHERIES
Three environmental non-governmental organizations chal-
lenged the NMFS: Greenpeace, American Oceans Campaign, and
the Sierra Club (“Plaintiffs”).67  However, Greenpeace’s involve-
ment in the North Pacific began in the 1980s.68  It pressured NMFS
59. Id.
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–83 (2000); see also Fritz, supra note 29, at 15.
61. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 30, at 6.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (promoting domestic fishing); 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a)
(preventing foreign fishing in the EEZ).
63. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB.  ADMIN., supra note 30, at 6.
64. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852-1853.
65. See Fritz, supra note 29, at 15.
66. Gerber, supra note 42, at 28.
67. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
68. American Oceans Campaign, The Biggest Sea Lion in the World . . . The
Biggest Fishery in the World: Decades of Decline, at http://www.american
oceans.org/ak/steller-pack4.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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to list the SSL as threatened in the late 1980s.69  In 1992, in Green-
peace Action v. Franklin,70 the organization challenged NMFS to
adopt protective measures for SSL, citing the increasing concentra-
tion of the trawl fishery and its negative impact on the SSL’s main
dietary source.71  Greenpeace’s legal complaints go considerably
beyond protection of the SSL.  It also objected to the increase in
the numbers and capacity of the trawl fishery, objected to their
concentration in time periods and spatial locations, and alleged
that these threatened not only the SSL but other species feeding on
the same prey: harbor seals, fur seals, and marine birds, which also
have registered rates of decline.72  Thus, the Greenpeace suit can be
regarded as a comprehensive challenge to agency actions that it
believed inadequately protected endangered species in the North
Pacific ecosystem.
In the litigation against NMFS, the Plaintiffs challenged the
agency’s protection of SSL under two pivotal laws enacted at the
high point of the American environmental movement: NEPA and
ESA.73  At the start of legal proceedings in 1998, two fisheries asso-
ciations petitioned for intervention: the At-Sea Processors Associa-
tion and the United Catcher Boats.74  Shortly thereafter, they were
joined by Westward Seafoods, other on-shore processors, and the
Aleutians East Borough.75  In a September 23, 1998 order, Judge
Zilly consolidated the similar petitions of these parties.76  He al-
lowed other associations to intervene in proceedings concerning
69. Id.
70. 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1992).
71. Id. at 1326–28.
72. Plaintiff’s complaint at 4, Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (No. C98-0492).
73. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000); National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2000); see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, COURTS, CONGRESS, AND CONSTITUENCIES:
MANAGING FISHERIES BY DEFAULT 11-42 (2002) (reviewing major legislation af-
fecting the North Pacific fisheries).
74. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of At-Sea
Processors Association for Leave to Intervene, at 1-2, Greenpeace I (No. C98-
0492C); Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene of United
Catcher Boats, at 1-2, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
75. Proposed Intervenor-Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Intervene as Defendants, at 1, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C); Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Intervene by Aleutians East Borough at 1, Greenpeace I
(No. C98-0492C).
76. Order Granting Proposed Intervenors’ Motions to Intervene in Part and
Denying Their Motions in Part, at 1, 6, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
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ESA claims, but limited involvement with NEPA claims.77  These
intervenors, and those who later associated themselves with the
case, represented the range in diversity of the Alaska groundfish
fisheries.78
The defendant, NMFS, and the different intervenors disagreed
on several aspects of the Plaintiffs’ challenges that parts of the fish-
ery allegedly jeopardized and adversely modified SSL critical habi-
tat.  Among the issues on which the defendant and associated in-
tervenors tended to agree included: (1) the North Pacific
groundfish fishery was conservatively managed; there was little
waste through by-catch, and no over-fishing; (2) The fisheries were
not so concentrated in time and space as to jeopardize the SSL or
adversely modify its critical habitat, although NMFS began to
change its position on this issue in late 1998; (3) No causal link had
been established between SSL declines and food shortages result-
ing from groundfish fishery removals; (4) the groundfish fishery
might have beneficial effects on marine mammals, by removing
cannibalistic older pollock that prey on young pollock, which in
turn are prey for SSL; (5) no interactive effects of fisheries or other
changes over time justified comprehensive environmental review;
and (6) existing fisheries management measures were sufficient to
protect the SSL.79  Indeed, when the court began consideration of
SSL conservation, defendants and intervenors introduced a differ-
77. Id. at 6 (“The intervenor will also be permitted to participate in the injunc-
tive relief portion of the NEPA claim to the extent they establish a direct, imme-
diate, and harmful effect on a legally protectable interest.”).
78. The organizations differ in species of fish harvested: pollock, Atka mack-
erel, Pacific cod or flatfish, rockfish, and other species.  They differ in size and
capitalization, from the large ocean trawlers to the smaller catcher vessels to the
under sixty foot-long boats plying coastal waters.  They differ in location of effort,
from completely offshore to onshore processors.  They also differ in gear, from the
trawl fishers to longliners.  These differences are the basis for competitive ten-
sions, only partly curbed by regulations.  Nevertheless, the challenge of the Plain-
tiffs to the management of the North Pacific groundfish fishery produced a unified
interest in the status quo and a unified litigation position. See generally Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of At-Sea Processors Asso-
ciation for Leave to Intervene, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C); Memorandum of
Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene of United Catcher Boats, Green-
peace I (No. C98-0492C); Proposed Intervenor-Defendants’ Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendants, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C);
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene by Aleutians East Borough,
Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
79. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment at 15-37, Greenpeace I, (No. C98-0492C); Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 3-26, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
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ent perspective from the plaintiffs, one strongly defensive of the
status quo.
IV.  ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service (I)80
The National Marine Fisheries Service had not been entirely
unresponsive to declines in the SSL population.  It listed the spe-
cies as threatened in 1990 and formed the SSL recovery team.81
The agency also took three protective actions: (1) it established a
three-nautical mile buffer (no transit) zone around rookeries in the
Gulf of Alaska and Aleutian Islands; (2) it prohibited shooting at
or near SSL; and (3) it reduced the allowable level of SSL take in-
cidental to commercial fishing operations.82  Yet while the endan-
gered species listing proceeded, NMFS increased opportunities for
fisheries, by allowing, for example, a nearly eighty-percent increase
in the total allowable catch level for the pollock stock in the Gulf of
Alaska.83
In 1991, prompted by a Greenpeace warning that it would seek
relief in federal court if total allowable catch levels were not low-
ered, NMFS implemented further spatial and temporal restrictions
in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska.84  New
regulations included restricting pollock fishery operations (sea-
sonal and year-round) from a ten- to twenty-nautical mile no-trawl
buffer zone around rookeries, splitting the pollock allocation be-
tween eastern and western Gulf of Alaska areas, and limiting the
total harvest during any quarter of the season.85  The next year,
jarred by the filing of Greenpeace Action v. Franklin,86 NMFS be-
gan implementation of more restrictive measures, such as increas-
ing buffer zones around select rookeries, seasonal fishing closures,
and further spatial and temporal allocation of fish species.87  Its
most significant action was the final designation of critical habitat
for the SSL, announced in August 1993.88  This designation identi-
fied over one hundred haulouts and forty rookeries and extended
80. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
81. Fritz, supra note 29, at 16.
82. Gerber, supra note 43, at 60.
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id. at 68.
85. Id.
86. 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. See Gerber, supra note 43, at 69-70.
88. Designated Critical Habitat; Stellar Sea Lion, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,269 (Sept.
27, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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offshore areas thought to be essential for foraging, reproduction,
and sustainability of the SSL.89
FIGURE 1: MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF THE STELLER
SEA LION
 90
NMFS staff conducted scientific studies which resulted in the dif-
ferentiation between the eastern and western stocks of the SSL.91
Based on this work and its own population viability analyses, the
SSL recovery team reported that if current trends continued,
chances of SSL extinction were significant.92  This led to the rec-
ommendation in 1995 that the western population of SSL be up-
graded to an endangered listing.93  The listing process took over
two years.94  In the interim, the fisheries continued to operate on a
status quo basis with no significant alteration of the fishery man-
agement plans for the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands or Gulf of
Alaska regions.  In fact, in 1996, NMFS concluded in a BiOp that
89. Fritz, supra note 29, at 16.
90. National Marine Mammal Laboratory, Stellar Sea Lion Distribution, at
http://nmml.afsc.noaa.gov/AlaskaEcosystems/sslhome/distrib.htm (last visited Feb.
8, 2004).
91. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1. These SSL are found
west of 144 degrees west longitude by Cape Suckling, Alaska.  See Figure 1.
92. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 1, 3 Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
93. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1; see also Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 3 Greenpeace I (No.
C98-0492C).
94. Id.
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the current fishery management plan did not jeopardize the spe-
cies.95
After listing the SSL as endangered, NMFS proposed no im-
mediate conservation measures.  In December 1997, the agency ac-
cepted the Council’s recommendation for a sixty-percent increase
in the western central pollock quota for the Gulf of Alaska (based
on stock assessments) and only minor reductions in the total allow-
able catches for the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands region.96  This
prompted the Plaintiffs to file suit in federal court, in Greenpeace
I.97
On December 3, 1998, the Office of Protected Resources of
NMFS issued a BiOp (“BiOp 1”) stating that the pollock fisheries
jeopardized the recovery of the SSL in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Is-
lands and Gulf of Alaska fisheries.98  This was a significant shift in
position by NMFS, which appears to have been the result of legal
pressures from environmental organizations and increased public
awareness of the SSL issue.99
A finding of jeopardy under ESA requires the protective
agency to outline specific “Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives”
to avoid adverse impacts.100  Instead of spelling out detailed reason-
able and prudent alternatives, NMFS crafted a three-part general
framework for avoiding the likelihood of adversely impacting the
SSL or modifying its critical habitat: (1) “temporal dispersion” of
the fishing effort; (2) “spatial dispersion” of the fishing effort; and
(3) protection from fisheries competition for SSL prey in waters
adjacent to important rookeries and haulouts.101  Thereupon, the
Council prepared alternative management measures, which were
incorporated in the BiOp as part of the reasonable and prudent al-
95. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 30, at 34.
96. See Greenpeace, A Steller Sea Lion Chronology, available at http://www.
greenpeaceusa.org/oceans/stellerchrontext.html (last updated July 2000).
97. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
98. Jeremy D. Rusin, Management of the Western Alaska Steller Sea Lion,
Eumetopias jubatus, Under the Endangered Species Act: Evolution of Interagency
Consultation and Impacts on Alaska Groundfish Fisheries 27 (2002) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Washington) (reviewing six recent biological opinions
of the agency).  BiOp 1 is the first biological opinion issued after the SSL was re-
classified from threatened to endangered in 1997.  It is the abbreviation used by
the agency, court, and plaintiffs.  See id. at 22.
99. See, e.g., Pollock v. Sea Lions, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at B4; Helen
Jung, Environmentalists File Suit to Protect Steller Sea Lions?, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 1998, at A1; see also, e.g., David Whitney, Sea Lions Join
Endangered Species List, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 1, 1997, at A1.
100. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.
101. See id. at 1264.
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ternatives for all Alaska pollock fisheries and put into effect in an
emergency listing in the Federal Register, to remain in effect until
the end of December 1999.102
Following the issuance of BiOp 1, the Plaintiffs amended their
complaint to the court.103  The environmental organizations main-
tained that the reasonable and prudent alternatives still did not
adequately protect the SSL and that the proposed 1999 reasonable
and prudent alternatives did not materially improve the conserva-
tion program for the SSL.104  NMFS and the defendant intervenors
disagreed, and, in a July 13, 1999 decision, Judge Zilly addressed
this conflict, as well as the supplemental environmental impact
statement issued by NMFS late in 1998.105  The judge upheld the
jeopardy finding for the pollock fisheries and found that reasonable
and prudent alternatives developed by the Council were “arbitrary
and capricious on this record.”106  The judge also ruled that NMFS
had violated NEPA by failing to prepare a comprehensive supple-
mental environmental impact statement.107
1. NEPA Claims.  The court held that the legal standard of
review in NEPA cases is whether the agency took a “hard look” at
the environmental consequences of federal action and whether the
supplemental environmental impact statement it issued was a “rea-
sonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the prob-
able environmental consequences.”108  The supplemental environ-
mental impact statement that NMFS issued in December 1998 was
the first since the original environmental impact statements had
been prepared in 1979 and 1981 for the Gulf of Alaska and Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands groundfisheries, respectively.  This was an
almost twenty-year period during which the fisheries and the North
Pacific environment had changed dramatically.109  Judge Zilly noted
that, from the early 1990s, internal agency criticism focused on the
inadequacy of existing environmental impact statement documents
and on the environmental assessments that had been prepared at
each major amendment to the fishery management plans; however,
102. Id.
103. First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
104. See id. at 20-21, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
105. See Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53.
106. Id. at 1268-69, 1276.
107. Id. at 1273.
108. Id. at 1269 (quoting Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177
F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 1999); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood,
161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989)).
109. See id. at 1270–71.
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NMFS waited until 1997 to begin preparation.110  The supplemental
environmental impact statement did update scientific information
about the North Pacific ecosystem, but its analysis was limited to a
range of alternative total allowable catch levels under which the
fisheries would be conducted.111  Judge Zilly agreed with the plain-
tiffs’ allegation that the scope of the supplemental environmental
impact statement was too narrow and the range of alternatives con-
sidered was insufficient.112
The supplemental environmental impact statement focused on
just one aspect of Fishery Management Plans, the total allowable
catch, and formulated alternatives in terms of different total allow-
able catch levels.113  Judge Zilly found that the statement did not
consider how new information about the ecosystem related to
other aspects of the fisheries regulated by fishery management
plans, such as “time and area closures, gear restrictions, bycatch
limits of prohibited species, and allocations of [total allowable
catch levels] among vessels.”114  The judge noted that NMFS also
promised that the supplemental environmental impact statement
would discuss such issues in its scoping notice.115  He agreed with
the plaintiffs’ interpretation of this language to imply that the
agency was obliged to consider effects of fishery management plans
as a whole, and that a “narrow [supplemental environmental im-
pact statement] dealing only with [total allowable catch] levels
would not satisfy NEPA.”116
The judge’s second reason for finding the scope of the sup-
plemental environmental impact statement too narrow was
NEPA’s requirement of cumulative impact analysis:
The Court has no doubt that the vast changes to the [fishery
management plans] have reached the threshold of “cumulatively
significant impact on the environment,” thereby requiring prepa-
ration of [a supplemental environmental impact statement] ad-
dressing these vast changes.  For the same reasons, NMFS can-
not then break the [fishery management plans] down “into small
component parts” by analyzing only the setting of [total allow-
able catch] levels rather than these [fishery management plans]
in their entirety.117
110. See id. at 1271.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1271-76.
113. Id. at 1271.
114. Id. at 1271-72 (quoting evidence in the record at S2-350 at 9).
115. Id. at 1272.
116. Id. at 1273.
117. Id. at 1274.
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Judge Zilly’s analysis of the range of alternatives flowed from his
findings that the supplemental environmental impact statement
lacked a broad, programmatic analysis of the fishery management
plans as a whole.  Also, he asked what advice decision makers
could derive from alternatives spelled out in terms of total allow-
able catch levels.118  He commented: “It does not help future deci-
sion-makers assess whether the fisheries should continue to be
conducted under the current structure of the [fishery management
plans], or whether other alternatives would be more beneficial.”119
He seemed to be influenced by the objection to the supplemental
environmental impact statement from EPA, added to the record by
Greenpeace, to the effect that NEPA dictated “‘inclusion of more
comprehensive alternatives which look at and programmatically
address all elements of the [fishery management plan].’”120  Finally,
the court rejected NMFS’s contention that it should defer to the
agency’s determination of the scope of the supplemental environ-
mental impact statement, remarking that “the government’s failure
to explain the connection between setting various [total allowable
catch] levels and the impact of other fishery regulations is not enti-
tled to deference, and even if the Court were to defer, the result
would be the same.”121
2. ESA Claims.  Judge Zilly’s order primarily concerned
BiOp 1 and the reasonable and prudent alternatives developed
from it.122  The Plaintiffs agreed with the agency’s jeopardy assess-
ment for the pollock fishery, but intervenors objected to it.123  The
plaintiffs disagreed with the agency’s finding of no jeopardy re-
garding the Atka mackerel fishery, but the intervenors agreed.124
The plaintiffs also challenged the final reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives, which the intervenors objected to as well.125  Judge Zilly
steered a middle course, agreeing with both the agency’s jeopardy
finding regarding the pollock fishery and the finding of no jeopardy
regarding Atka mackerel, but opposed the final reasonable and
prudent alternatives because he could not ascertain from the rec-
ord how they resolved jeopardy.126
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Pl.’s Ex. 3, at 5).
121. Id. at 1275.
122. See id. at 1259-69.
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1264.
126. Id. at 1269.
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“Challenges to Biological Opinions issued,” under the terms of
ESA, can be reviewed by courts under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, using the review standard of whether the opinion is “‘ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.’”127  Judge Zilly cited four clarifications: (1)
“‘whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment’”128;
(2) whether “‘the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider . . . entirely failed to consider an impor-
tant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation . . . that runs
counter to the evidence, . . . or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view’”129; (3) when it “‘fails to articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its actions’”130; and (4) “‘the focal
point for judicial review should be the administrative record al-
ready in existence, not some new record made initially in the re-
viewing court.’”131
Of particular relevance to the discussion of the role of science
and uncertainty in decision-making on SSL issues are Judge Zilly’s
clarifications on the deference a court should pay to an administra-
tive agency with scientific expertise but without certain knowledge
concerning the species it protects:
“Deference to an agency’s technical expertise and experience is
particularly warranted with respect to questions involving engi-
neering and scientific matters.”. . .When scientific evidence is
equivocal, a court is to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpre-
tation of that evidence. . . . “When specialists express conflicting
views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable
opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original mat-
ter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.”. . . “The
deference a court must accord an agency’s scientific . . . expertise
is not unlimited, however.  Thus the presumption of agency ex-
pertise may be rebutted if its decisions, even though based on
scientific expertise, are not reasoned.”132
Then the judge proceeded to evaluate whether NMFS had in fact
insured that its actions in the management of the North Pacific
fisheries did “not ‘jeopardize’ endangered species or ‘adversely
127. Id. at 1259 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).
128. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378
(1989) (internal citations omitted)).
129. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
130. Id. (quoting N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482 (W.D. Wash.
1989)).
131. Id. (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
132. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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modify’ their critical habitat,” with respect to BiOp 1 assessments
of the pollock fishery, the Atka mackerel fishery, and the pollock
reasonable and prudent alternatives.133
Judge Zilly considered three objections of the intervenors re-
garding the pollock fishery jeopardy assessment: 1) whether NMFS
considered “relevant information contrary to its conclusion”; 2)
whether “existing scientific data” supported the agency’s conclu-
sions; and 3) whether the agency’s methodology was speculative.134
The industry’s first objection had focused on recent evidence of
climate shift and environmental change as well as “reduced ‘carry-
ing capacity’” of the North Pacific ecosystem as a whole.135  This is-
sue had been discussed by NMFS, but the BiOp concluded that
“[t]he existence of a strong environmental influence on sea lion
trends does not rule out the possibility of significant fisheries-
related effects.”136  Zilly agreed with the agency’s use of “‘discretion
to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts.’”137
Second, the judge supported NMFS’s “competition theory,”
which suggests that SSL and the fisheries competed with each other
for available prey.138  The third point is probably the most conten-
tious in the SSL controversy: the lack of conclusive evidence about
the cause of decline in the endangered species population.139  In its
response to the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s motions for summary
judgment, the defendant-intervenors (“Industry”) asserted: “Scien-
tists who have analyzed data at any level of detail have found con-
sistently that the gross correlations (decline of SSL coinciding with
133. Id. at 1259-60.  The implementing regulations of ESA define these two
terms.  They recognize “jeopardize” as  “the continued existence of means to en-
gage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to re-
duce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed spe-
cies in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species.”  Id. at 1260 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.2 (2003)).  “Destruction or adverse
modification” is defined as “‘a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably di-
minishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed
species  . . .  [including] alterations adversely modifying any of those physical or
biological features that were the basis for determining the habitat to be critical.”
Id.
134. Id.
135. Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 3-5, Greenpeace I (W.D. Dist. Wash. 1999) (No. C98-0492C).
136. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d  at 1261 (quoting evidence in the record at
S1-55 at 73).
137. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378
(1989)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1261–62.
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prosecution of large scale trawl fisheries) Greenpeace used do not
establish a cause/effect relationship between the fisheries and the
SSL decline.”140  Judge Zilly acknowledged that the evidence was
not conclusive, but referred to ESA, which requires only that deci-
sions be made on the basis of “the best scientific and commercial
data available.”141  Then the judge lauded the two-step approach
NMFS had taken to support its jeopardy assessment, which had
considered and rejected a series of “potential non-fishery causes of
SSL decline,” such as predation, toxic substances, research, natural
environmental changes, and prey quality.142  Then NMFS made
three assumptions, which it supported with detailed evidence:
1. “The abundance of any species in a particular space at a par-
ticular time is finite”; therefore removing hundreds of thou-
sands of tons of fish per day must, “at least on a very local
scale and for short periods of time, reduce the biomass of the
[remaining] targeted fish”143;
2. The likelihood of localized depletions rises when fish are
patchily distributed, as pollock are144; and
3. “[I]f the reductions in schools of pollock or mackerel occur
within the foraging areas of the endangered western popula-
tion of Steller sea lions, the reduced availability of prey is
likely to reduce the foraging effectiveness of sea lions.”145
Judge Zilly found these assumptions to be reasonable and, al-
though the fisheries were not the sole cause of SSL decline or the
major factor preventing recovery, they nevertheless were likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of the SSL population.146  He
concluded: “NMFS provided a reasonable interpretation of
equivocal evidence, to which this court must defer.”147
Greenpeace argued that for the same reasons NMFS found
that the pollock fishery jeopardized SSL, it should find the Atka
mackerel fishery in jeopardy, but the court upheld NMFS’ deter-
mination.148  The judge noted that the Atka mackerel fishery took a
much smaller part of the overall groundfish catch in the Bering
140. Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors in Response to Plaintiff’s and
Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, Greenpeace I (No. C98-0492C).
141. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(2000)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v.  U.S. EPA, 990 F.2d
1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993)).
148. Id. at 1262–63 (citing evidence in the record S1-55, at 17–19).
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Sea/Aleutian Islands than the pollock fishery.149  Of greater impor-
tance, the Atka mackerel fishery operated under different spatial
and temporal rules, and the Council, accepting NMFS’ advice, had
reduced the competitive threat of the fishery to SSL.150
The last area of examination considered the solutions NMFS
had proposed to problems identified in BiOp 1: the reasonable and
prudent alternatives.151  The judge sided with Greenpeace, which
challenged both the proposed and final reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives because they failed to analyze jeopardy and adverse
modification separately.152  Additionally, the court faulted the
Council for having weakened recommendations in the BiOp for
greater temporal dispersion of the fisheries.153  The crux of the
judge’s decision was that the agency had not rationally based the
“reasonable and prudent alternatives” on general principles in the
BiOp.154  For example, BiOp 1 called for temporal dispersion of  the
fisheries to lessen competition with SSL for prey, but the final rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives did not disperse the fishery tem-
porally.155  The judge commented: “NMFS has completely failed to
analyze how these individual measures avoid jeopardy or adverse
modification.  NMFS also has not explained how the various man-
agement measures work together.”156  When the judge questioned
NMFS’ counsel about the analysis used in formulating the “reason-
able and prudent alternatives,” counsel responded “NMFS is rely-
ing on the statistics.  We’re relying on the numbers. . . .”157  NMFS’
Endangered Species Act Consultation Handbook made it clear that
the agency had to provide analysis, meaning “‘a thorough explana-
tion of how each component of the alternative is essential to avoid
149. Id. at 1263.
150. See id. The Council split the mackerel season and total allowable catch
into two parts.  Id.
151. Id. at 1264.  Judge Zilly clarified the regulatory definition for reasonable
and prudent alternatives found in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003).  Any valid RPA must
meet four tests: “[I]t must (1) be consistent with the purpose of the underlying ac-
tion; (2) be consistent with the action agency’s authority; (3) be economically and
technically feasible; and (4) ‘avoid the likelihood’ of jeopardy or adverse modifica-
tion.”  Id.
152. Id. at 1265.
153. Id. at 1265–66.
154. Id. (stating that the three principles are “temporal dispersion, spatial dis-
persion, and protection of rookeries and haulouts.”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1267.
157. Id.
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jeopardy and/or adverse modification.’”158  The court was therefore
left with no alternative but to find the “reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives” arbitrary and capricious,159 consistent with prior ESA
decisions such as Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt:160 “where an
agency fails to articulate a ‘rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made, .  .  . [the court or counsel] may not
supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency it-
self has not given.’”161
The judge’s final question was whether the “reasonable and
prudent alternatives” were arbitrary and capricious because NMFS
failed to meet the ESA test that alternatives must be “economically
and technologically feasible.”162  Curiously, the judge prefaced his
analysis with the statement: “it remains an open question whether
this requirement should be interpreted as referring only to whether
the [reasonable and prudent alternatives are] feasible for the
agency, or whether it relates to the effects on third parties.”163
Judge Zilly then closed the question by citing Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,164 in which the court enjoined the opening of a
nearly completed dam because its opening would eliminate an en-
dangered species’ critical habitat.165  He affirmed “[t]he ‘guiding
standard’ for determination of [reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives] is jeopardy[,] . . . not economic impact on third parties such
as the fishing industry.”166  Third party concerns could be consid-
ered, but only as the second step after the agency had first formu-
lated a range of possible measures, none of which jeopardized the
species.167  NMFS’ error had been to approve “changes in manage-
ment measures based solely on an attempt to minimize the impact
on the fishing industry, without explicitly considering what effect
the changes would have on the Steller sea lions.”168  On this point,
Judge Zilly appears to have been influenced by correspondence
158. Id. (quoting U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ET AL., ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 4-41 (1998)).
159. Id.
160. 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1997).
161. Id.  at 679.
162. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002)).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
165. Id. at 193-94.
166. Greenpeace I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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from an NMFS scientist in the administrative record indicating con-
fusion in NMFS regulatory priorities.169
Following his decision, Judge Zilly remanded both BiOp 1 and
the supplemental Environmental Impact Statement to the NMFS.170
By invalidating the reasonable and prudent alternatives, the court
had required the agency to prepare revised final reasonable and
prudent alternatives consistent with its order, which the agency was
not able to produce until October of the following year.171  By in-
validating the supplemental environmental impact statement, the
judge effectively re-opened the environmental review process in
the agency and did so by putting NMFS on a clock: its administra-
tor was required to make progress reports to the court every 60
days.172  The agency appeared to heed criticism of its environmental
review process, particularly provisions on public comment and de-
velopment of meaningful alternatives.  This lengthened the review,
and the agency did not complete its draft programmatic supple-
mental environmental impact statement until 2001.173  Before con-
cluding the process, NMFS withdrew the document to consider
more carefully any environmental alternatives.174  The agency
planned to issue the final programmatic supplemental environ-
mental impact statement and record of decision by late 2005, but
Judge Zilly, responding to Greenpeace’s complaint in 2002, re-
quired that the work be finished by September 1, 2004.175
B. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service (II)176
Greenpeace II continued the Greenpeace I litigation, but it es-
tablished little new legal ground.  Whereas the first Greenpeace ac-
169. Id. “[P]rotective measures for [sea lions] appear to be less urgent than
consideration of impacts to the fishing industry.  I thought that we were still in the
role of the consultation agency in deciding what needed to be done for the Stellers
and later, as action agency, we would find the best way to implement [reasonable
and prudent alternatives] with industry concerns in mind.  Have I misunderstood
the process, or does it appear that several steps are going on at the same time
here?” Id. at 1268 n.31.
170. Id. at 1277.
171. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066,  1069 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
172. See Declaration of Dr. James W. Balsinger at 2-3, Greenpeace I, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (No. C98-0492Z).
173. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE (ALASKA REGION), STELLER
SEA LION PROTECTION MEASURES: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT (2001).
174. See Defendants’ Motion of Filing, Declaration of Ronald Berg, at 4-5,
Greenpeace I (W.D. Wash. 2001) (No. C98-0492Z).
175. See Order at 3, Greenpeace I (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C98-0492Z).
176. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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tion considered the flaws in BiOp 1 of December 3, 1998, the sec-
ond concerned inadequacies in a second BiOp (“BiOp 2”), issued
by NMFS on December 22, 1998.177
The subject of this court opinion was the comprehensiveness
of the biological opinion for fishery management plans, adopted by
the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council with the guidance
of NMFS, which also served as the implementing agency.  Under
authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act,178 the Council developed two original plans, one
for the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands in 1978 and the second for
the Gulf of Alaska fishery in 1982.179  Since their original adoption,
the fishery management plans had been amended dozens of
times.180 The plans “utilize[d] a myriad of interrelated regulations to
manage the fisheries” concerning when, where, and how the fish-
eries are conducted.181
Before issuing its December 1998 BiOp, NMFS had consulted
twice on the environmental effects of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Is-
lands and Gulf of Alaska groundfish fishery management plans.182
In April 1991, NMFS issued two biological opinions examining the
effects of the fisheries on species listed under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, including the Steller sea lion.183  Then, four years later,
NMFS reinitiated consultation, and in January 1996, it again issued
biological opinions on the overall impacts of the North Pacific fish-
ery management plans on listed species.184  NMFS had concluded
that this opinion remained valid for the 1998 Bering Sea/Aleutian
Islands groundfish fishery, even after the western SSL had been re-
classified as endangered in 1997.185  However, because of a sixty
percent increase in the total allowable catches of Gulf of Alaska
pollock for 1998, NMFS reinitiated consultation on that fishery,
concluding in a March 1998 biological opinion that it was not likely
to jeopardize the SSL or adversely modify its critical habitat.186
These two biological opinions, the 1996 opinion for the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands and the March 1998 opinion for the Gulf of
177. Id. at 1139.
178. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331.
179. Greenpeace II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40.
180. Id. at 1140.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1141.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Alaska, were the subject of Greenpeace’s April 1998 suit.187  NMFS
argued at the time that the litigation should be stayed because it
was preparing a new supplemental environmental impact statement
addressing the two fishery management plans, and that it was con-
sulting on a biological opinion under section 7 of ESA that would
“examine all Federally-managed fisheries in the [Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands] and [Gulf of Alaska].”188  Based on the
agency’s promises, Judge Zilly granted the stay.189  In December
1998, NMFS issued the supplemental environmental impact state-
ment as well as two biological opinions.  The first, BiOp 1, treated
the pollock and Atka mackerel fisheries, and the second, BiOp 2,
encompassed the entire groundfish fisheries.190  Following the
court’s order of remand for preparation of revised reasonable and
prudent alternatives and a comprehensive supplemental environ-
mental impact statement, NMFS “[took] back” BiOp  2 and reiniti-
ated consultation on the effects of the entire groundfish manage-
ment scheme.191
From NMFS’ perspective, BiOp 2 was adequate for the 1999
fisheries, but because it had been withdrawn to reinitiate consulta-
tion, the issue of its adequacy was moot—a perspective with which
industry agreed.192  To Greenpeace, the 1998 biological opinion was
flawed because it did not measure the cumulative effects of the
fishery on the SSL.193  If, on the other hand, the opinion were in
consultation, and thus not available for legal challenge, then no
opinion governed the fishery, which was a violation of ESA.194  The
court agreed with Greenpeace.195
In his decision, the judge relied extensively on Conner v. Bur-
ford,196  which held that biological opinions under ESA must be
“coextensive” with the agency action, and that the action had to be
construed broadly.197  In the context of the North Pacific fisheries,
the relevant action was permitting the groundfishery pursuant to
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1142 (quoting Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Stay at 4,
Greenpeace  I (No. C98-0492Z)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1143 (quoting Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 2, 7, Greenpeace  I (No. C98-0492Z)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1152.
195. Id.
196. 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
197. Greenpeace II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44 (quoting Conner, 848 F.2d at
1458).
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fishery management plans, and thus ESA could be satisfied only
with a comprehensive biological opinion coextensive in scope with
the fishery management plans.198  Industry argued that NMFS’
authorization of the 1999 fishery indicated sufficiency in scope of
the BiOp 2,199 to which the judge responded in an unusual state-
ment of judicial power that the court and not the agency had the
responsibility of defining agency action subject to consultation.200
Judge Zilly required the fishery management plans to contain
“all of the rules, regulations, conditions, methods, and other meas-
ures” necessary to “rebuild, restore, and maintain any fishery re-
source.”201  The regulatory scheme was designed to apply to all
groundfish species managed under the North Pacific fishery man-
agement plans.202  However, the judge pointed out three omissions
or flaws in the BiOp 2.203  First, it failed to analyze critically “how
core management measures such as the processes for deriving ac-
ceptable biological catch, overfishing, and total allowable catch im-
pact endangered species.”204  Second, the agency had not examined
the cumulative effects of the fisheries on the SSL.205  The BiOp con-
tained “no explanation of how the various groundfish fisheries and
fishery management measures interrelate and how the overall
management regime may or may not affect Steller sea lions.”206  Fi-
nally, the agency did not appraise the effect of the fishery man-
agement plans on SSL critical habitat.207  Judge Zilly further noted:
NMFS itself repeatedly concludes in BiOp 2 that it simply lacks
the information to make any determination one way or the other
[on whether the fisheries compete with the SSL for prey]. . . .
Thus, NMFS’s analysis is admittedly incomplete and its conclu-
sions inconclusive.  Although inconclusive data does not neces-
sarily render a particular scientific conclusion invalid, the limited
scope and quality of analysis that is contained in BiOp2 serves to
highlight its overall inadequacy. .  .  . NMFS entirely ignored
relevant factors and admittedly failed to analyze and develop
projections based on information that was available.208
198. Id. at 1144-45.
199. Id at 1145.
200. Id. at 1146.
201. Id. at 1147 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (2000)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1148-49.
204. Id. at 1148.
205. Id. at 1149.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1150.
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In effect, the judge did not fault the agency for lack of knowledge
about SSL, but for the way it treated the information it had.
NMFS had argued that the issue was moot because it had
“taken back” BiOp 2, and that by reinitiating consultation, there
was no final agency action for a court to consider, as required by
the Administrative Procedure Act.209  The judge pointed out that
this did not remove requirements under ESA for protection of the
listed species, which the court would continue to enforce.210  Thus,
NMFS was obliged to provide a comprehensive biological opinion
that addressed the full scope of the fishery management plans.211
The 1998 BiOp 2 was legally inadequate.212 Moreover, if the agency
had withdrawn it, nothing remained that fulfilled the dictates of
ESA: “Either way, NMFS is in violation of the ESA until such time
as a comprehensive biological opinion is in place.”213  The judge
concluded by castigating the agency for its tardiness.214
C. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service (III)215
In Greenpeace III, the plaintiffs again sought an injunction,
specifically focusing on the harm that continued trawl fishing posed
to the SSL and its critical habitat.216  Previously, Greenpeace had
sought to enjoin the pollock fisheries in 1998 because the “reason-
able and prudent alternatives” of the 1998 BiOp were flawed, but
the court declined to issue an injunction pending preparation of re-
vised reasonable and prudent alternatives, issued by the agency in
October 1999.217  The judge’s decision in Greenpeace II left the
agency operating under the revised final reasonable and prudent
alternatives and emergency regulations. 218  This permitted the 2000
209. Id. at 1150–51.
210. Id. at 1151–52.
211. Id. at 1152.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
More than one year ago NMFS declared it was preparing a com-
prehensive biological opinion addressing the full scope of the
North Pacific groundfish [fishery management plans], as required
under the ESA.  Having failed to live up to its obligations under
the law, NMFS once again invites the Court to withhold judicial
review while it undertakes to do what should have been done
long ago.  The Court declines the invitation.
 Id.
215. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
216. Id. at 1067.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1070.
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North Pacific groundfish fisheries to continue fishing with a large
part of them doing so within SSL critical habitat.
Judge Zilly’s order of July 2000 noted several important
changes in the situation of the North Pacific fishery.  First, from the
1950s through the 1990s, the total annual removal of groundfish in
Alaska had increased over 7,500%.219  Second, the SSL population
had continued to decline, based on NMFS’ estimates, approxi-
mately 24% between 1990 and 1998 (see Figure 2).220  Third, de-
spite the agency’s protective measures, much of the SSL critical
habitat remained open to fishing.221  In 1999, some 350,000 metric
tons of pollock, 79,000 metric tons of Pacific cod, and 29,000 metric
tons of Atka mackerel (36%, 50%, and 52% of annual catches, re-
spectively) were caught in critical habitat zones of the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands.222  Given the fact that “nutritional stress”
caused by lack of food availability remained the primary scientific
hypothesis for the decline in SSL population, these changes were
ominous.223
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1071.
221. Id.  Trawl exclusion zones extended only to ten nautical miles.  Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1070.
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FIGURE 2: INDICATING THE DECLINE OF VARIOUS
SEA LION  STOCKS
224
Injunctive relief is warranted if the challenger demonstrates
likelihood of “success on the merits” and “irreparable injury” to
the species if relief is not granted.225  Greenpeace II indicated that
NMFS was in substantial violation of the procedural requirements
of ESA, and that the further implementation of the fishery man-
agement plans and the authorization of annual fisheries under
them continued the violation of ESA.226  Thus, the plaintiffs had
demonstrated their likelihood of success on the merits, leaving for
the court to decide whether they had met the burden of showing
irreparable injury under the ESA.227
In interpreting ESA, Judge Zilly contrasted section 9, which
defendants and intervenors sought to apply, with section 7, which
the plaintiffs sought to apply:
224. NATIONAL MARINE MAMMAL LABORATORY, STELLER SEA LION DECLINE,
at http://nmml.afsc.noaa.gov/AlaskaEcosystems/sslhome/decline.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2004).  The dark line indicates Steller sea lion population decline of the
western stock.  Id.
225. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1072–73.
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Under ESA section 9, “harm” to a species is a term of art which
falls within the regulatory definition of “take.”  Thus, under
ESA section 9, a showing of future “harm” is required in order
to prove that “a violation of the ESA is at least likely in the fu-
ture.”  Unlike section 9 which is strictly prohibitory in nature,
section 7 imposes a “rigorous” affirmative duty on federal agen-
cies to “insure” that their actions do not result in jeopardy or ad-
verse modification and prescribes the procedures for compliance
 .  .  .  This duty must be fulfilled before initiation of agency ac-
tion.228
Judge Zilly also made reference to the Ninth Circuit case Thomas
v. Peterson,229 using it as the standard for injunctive relief.230
Thomas concerned the U.S. Forest Service’s failure “to pre-
pare a biological assessment to determine the potential effects of
construction of a logging road and related timber sales on the en-
dangered Rocky Mountain gray wolf.”231  The Ninth Circuit held
that “[g]iven a substantial procedural violation of the ESA [build-
ing the road] in connection with a federal project, the remedy must
be an injunction of the project pending compliance with the ESA,”
and that “irreparable damage is presumed to flow from a failure to
properly evaluate the environmental impact of a major federal ac-
tion.”232  In short, stringent enforcement of ESA’s procedural re-
quirements was essential; without such compliance, “there can be
no assurance that a violation of the ESA’s substantive provisions
will not result.”233
Applying Thomas, Judge Zilly found that NMFS had violated
ESA: “[b]y authorizing the yearly fisheries in the absence of an
adequate, comprehensive biological opinion, NMFS has failed to
‘insure’ that these fisheries will not likely jeopardize the Steller sea
lion or adversely modify its critical habitat.  This failure is not
merely a technical oversight.”234  The agency had not critically ana-
lyzed whether core management measures would affect the SSL or
whether large catch levels within critical habitat would conserve
the species.235
The judge further contended that even when applying a
tougher standard of harm—placing the burden on the plaintiffs to
228. Id. at 1075 (citations omitted).
229. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
230. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
231. Id.
232. Id. (quoting Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1075.
235. Id.  An example of a core management measure is the process used to de-
termine the level of total allowable catch.  Id.
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prove that on-going trawl fishing in SSL critical habitat presented a
“reasonably certain threat of imminent harm”—the standard had
been met and an injunction was warranted.236  A significant portion
of the 1999 catch had come from the critical habitat of the sea li-
ons.237  The catch yet to be taken from June to December 2000 rep-
resented over 25 percent of the total remaining allowable catch.238
These large removals of pollock had diminished the value of criti-
cal habitat as a prey resource.239  Also, the judge stated that trawl
nets would create temporary “localized depletions” of prey as well
as change the “schooling dynamics of target schools by affecting
their density, size and persistence, thus further disadvantaging sea
lion foraging and exaggerating the fisheries’ competitive effects.”240
The judge reasoned that the potential adverse effects of the
fisheries on the SSL had been demonstrated with “reasonable sci-
entific certainty” because “although the actual effects of the fish-
eries and the efficacy of mitigation measures are uncertain, the sig-
nificant and demonstrated potential negative effects of these large
fisheries constitute a clear threat to appreciably diminish the value
of critical habitat for Steller sea lions.”241  Therefore, he rejected
NMFS’ assertion that Greenpeace’s claims of harm are speculative
because scientific uncertainties prevented conclusive determination
of the fisheries’ actual effects on the SSL.242  He stated that though
Greenpeace’s claims of harm were not conclusive, “the standard
did not require conclusive proof, but only that decisions . . . be
based on the best scientific data available.”243
Unlike the previous complaints, Greenpeace III considered
expert opinion as well as the administrative record because the is-
sue concerned injunctive relief.  Each of the parties—plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and intervenors—introduced declarations to the court
without objection.244  Most persuasive to Judge Zilly was the decla-
236. Id. at 1076.  “Harm” under this standard was defined as “jeopardy” or
“adverse modification” as those terms were utilized by ESA.  Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1077.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. “If NMFS’s scientific conclusions were sufficiently certain to conclude
that actual jeopardy and adverse modification were likely, NMFS cannot now be
heard to say that this same evidence is insufficiently certain to conclude that such
harm is unlikely.”  Id. at 1078.
244. Id. at 1078.  However, Judge Zilly remarked that NMFS’s search for proof
outside the administrative record in order to defend actions for which it had not
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ration of David Lavigne, a pinniped specialist for some thirty years,
who was the plaintiff’s expert.  The judge approvingly cited Lavi-
gne’s statements with respect to the adverse impact of reduction in
prey availability on the SSL, the failure of spatial and temporal
dispersion measures to protect the SSL because fishery effects
could not be isolated to the time and place of fishing, and the lim-
ited utility of stock assessments in determining whether or not prey
had been depleted on a local level.245  Moreover, Lavigne pointed
out that the combined effects of removing several prey species
from SSL critical habitat would likely amplify adverse effects:
“[S]ynergistic and cumulative effects of the removal of these im-
portant sea lion prey species, together with the other groundfish
fisheries, are necessarily more significant than any one of the fish-
eries considered individually.”246
The judge considered the other declarations but did not need
to choose among them.  It was sufficient that the Thomas standard
had been met because “based on the particular factual and proce-
dural stance of this case, where significant, potentially harmful ac-
tivity is presently on-going in the face of a substantial, unremedied
procedural violation of the ESA, the ‘institutionalized caution’
mandated by section 7 strikes the balance in favor of the endan-
gered Steller sea lion.”247  The judge concluded that Greenpeace
had proven that trawl fishing did pose “a reasonably certain threat
of imminent harm” to the SSL and its critical habitat.248  He en-
joined all groundfish trawl fishing in SSL critical habitat in the
Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska west of 144 de-
grees west longitude, effective August 8, 2000.249
D. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service (IV)250
The fourth decision in this quartet of court orders concerns
supplemental complaints of Greenpeace about the management of
the fisheries after the early August injunction.  It encompasses im-
portant changes and political involvement in NMFS’ fisheries man-
agement strategy, yet the changes were insufficient to satisfy the
court.
completed a formal environmental review created a situation in which “the spec-
ter of a foregone conclusion haunts the proceedings.”  Id.
245. Id. at 1079.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1080.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
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Judge Zilly closed the trawl fishery in August 2000,251 at a time
when most fishing had been concluded, but the prospect of contin-
ued closure at the January 2001 opening of the first pollock season
mobilized the agency to prepare a biological opinion and reason-
able and prudent alternatives that would avoid jeopardy and ad-
verse modification to the SSL’s critical habitat.252  In a process that
eventually involved the national headquarters, the agency issued a
biological opinion called the fishery management plan BiOp on
November 30, 2000, with a jeopardy and adverse modification
finding, and developed a reasonable and prudent alternatives
statement to accompany it.253  Thereupon, the judge lifted the in-
junction, and fishing was allowed to proceed.254
However, the reasonable and prudent alternatives contained
severe measures for the North Pacific fishery: closure of two-thirds
of SSL critical habitat to all fishing for pollock, Pacific cod, and
Atka mackerel, and both spatial distribution and temporal redistri-
bution of fishing within the rest of the critical habitat.255  Both the
council and industry objected to what they called draconian meas-
ures and immediately sought assistance from Alaska’s senior Sena-
tor Ted Stevens, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee.256
Following the fishery management plan BiOp issuances, an indus-
try committee prepared text for the Stevens’ rider attached to an
appropriations bill before Congress to limit the implementation of
the reasonable and prudent alternatives.257  The Clinton Admini-
stration insisted on modifications to the rider, which Congress
adopted on December 15, 2000.258
The Stevens rider transformed terms of the discussion.  It al-
lowed the fishery to proceed in January 2001 with no more restric-
tions than in the early 2000 season.259  It mandated that the Council
251. Kristen R. Mabry et al., Steller Sea Lions and Fisheries Management in
Alaska, at http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc02/pap0520/p0520.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2004).
252. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Sea Lion Compromise Reached: Senator Stevens lets Congress go
Home, EARTHJUSTICE, Dec. 15, 2000, at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display.
html?ID=59.
257. Greenpeace III, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
258. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 209 et
seq., 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-176 (2000).
259. § 209(c); see also Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (W.D. Wash.
2002) (stating that the legislation resulted in amended reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives that reopened areas of fishing closed by the prior one and removed the
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and agency consult and review the fishery management plan BiOp
RPA with respect to developing measures to protect the SSL and
its critical habitat.260  The rider allocated $30 million in disaster re-
lief assistance for coastal Alaska communities, which had suffered
because of near shore closures, and it provided $20 million more
for scientific research into the causes of SSL decline.261
Following the passage of the rider, the Council emerged as a
more equal partner to the agency.  The Council formed an RPA
committee to propose changes to the fishery management plan
BiOp’s RPA.  The committee was representative of affected
stakeholders, but only three environmental non-governmental or-
ganization representatives sat on it, as compared to eleven industry
representatives.262  In response, Greenpeace alleged that the com-
mittee was “industry-dominated” from the start.263
The RPA committee significantly weakened the original RPA
by, for example, reopening closed areas to fishing from ten to
twenty nautical miles in SSL critical habitat, and reducing or elimi-
nating temporal and spatial dispersion measures.264  Meanwhile, the
agency re-initiated consultation on the fishery management plan.
Based on its review of six new studies and new telemetry data dis-
cussed below, the agency issued the 2001 BiOp in October 2001.265
This opinion did not reach a jeopardy or adverse modification
finding.  It announced that the fishery management plan BiOp
would remain in effect “as NMFS’ coverage at the plan level, and
this opinion will address the project level effects on listed species
that would be likely to occur if the Council’s preferred action were
implemented.”266  The 2001 BiOp found that the RPA committee’s
measures were not likely to jeopardize the SSL or adversely modify
its critical habitat.267  Greenpeace posed two challenges to the
agency under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, claiming
that the biological opinions were arbitrary and capricious under the
temporal and spatial distributions effected by the prior reasonable and prudent
alternatives).
260. Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
261. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 209(d)(e).
262. Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, at 5 (n.1), Greenpeace I (W.D. Wash. 2002) (No. C98-0492Z).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 6.
265. Defendants’ Opposition to Summary Judgment, Cross-motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, and Memorandum in Support of Cross-motion for Summary
Judgment, at 12, Greenpeace  I (No. C98-0492Z).
266. 2001 BiOp, p. 8, cited in Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
267. Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
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Administrative Procedure Act and failed to protect the SSL. 268  The
main issues are addressed below and concern the global fishing rate
established by the agency, its new zonal approach to mitigation
within critical habitat, and the soundness of agency analysis.
1. Challenge to the Global Fishing Rate.  Greenpeace claimed
that both the fishery management plan BiOp of 2000 and the 2001
BiOp were flawed because determination of jeopardy and adverse
modification would not occur until SSL prey populations dropped
below target population thresholds.269  First, Greenpeace objected
to the overall level of fishing, contending that it adversely influ-
enced the carrying capacity of the SSL critical habitat.270  The judge
favorably cited the fishery management plan BiOp’s statement that
there existed “no significant, relevant evidence that the current ex-
ploitation strategy (which reduces the biomass to between 40 and
60% of the predicted unfished biomass) adversely affects listed
species by reducing their likelihood for survival and recovery in the
wild.”271  Judge Zilly approved of the finding notwithstanding one
sentence in the same BiOp stating that “biomass reductions of
Steller sea lion prey species, along with other factors such as cli-
mate change, natural predators, etc., were a significant contributing
factor of the reduction and current decline of the population of
Steller sea lions.”272  The judge found evidence in the administrative
record and two biological opinions that by sufficiently considering
the ecosystem-wide effects of prey removal and forage availability
in light of the chief concern of localized depletion, the agency did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its assessments and conclu-
sions.273
The second part of this challenge concerned the efficacy of the
global control rule implemented by the agency in the 2001 BiOp,
which was somewhat weaker than that in the fishery management
plan BiOp.274  Both rules provided more protection than available
268. Supplemental Complaint at 4-6, Greenpeace IV (W.D. Wash. 2002) (No.
C98-0492Z).
269. Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–88.
270. Id. at 1188.
271. Id. at 1188, 1190.
272. Id. at 1188 (quoting 2000 BiOp).
273. Id. at 1190.
274. Id.
The global control rule is a protective measure that alters the
allowable biological catch (“ABC”) of pollock, Pacific cod, and
Atka mackerel on a sliding scale basis as projected prey stocks
drop.  The goal of the global control rule is to prevent a decline
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before 2000, when NMFS did not reduce fishing until prey stocks
fell below 40% of unfished levels and did not ban fishing until
stocks fell to 2% of unfished levels.275  Yet the 2001 BiOp limited
fishing at a slower rate than the 2000 rule, between 40% and 20%,
at which point it prohibited fishing.276  At oral argument, the plain-
tiff acknowledged that ESA did not require agencies to declare a
line beyond which jeopardy or adverse modification would occur.277
The court found the 20% line rational and sufficiently protective,
particularly because none of the primary prey species had declined
nearly that far.278  In short, the judge agreed that the agency had
developed defensible harvest rates and global control rules, which
conformed to ESA requirements.279
2. Challenge to the Zonal Approach. Judge Zilly held differ-
ently concerning the agency’s application and analysis of the zonal
approach.280  In the 2001 BiOp and its embedded reasonable and
prudent alternatives, NMFS adopted a new method for acquiring
data—telemetry281—in order to differentiate the SSL’s critical habi-
tat.282  On the basis of the more detailed telemetry information, the
agency concluded that three-fourths of SSL foraging occurred
within ten nautical miles of shore and only one-fourth beyond ten
nautical miles.283  Then, in the 2001 BiOp, the agency ranked areas
of critical habitat by different levels of importance and allowed
fishing in far-from-shore areas previously excluded from use.284
in total biomass to a level that would jeopardize Steller sea li-
ons.
 Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1190 n.7.
277. Id. at 1192.
278. Id.  The court particularly noted that the 2001 BiOp would ban fishing
when stock was ten times the level used in 2000.  Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1199.
281. Since 1990, NMFS had tracked movement of SSL by satellite telemetry.
Scientists attached a small package of electronics including a satellite linked time-
depth recorder to the back of the SSL.  The recorder transmitted information on
depth to an orbiting satellite, which then triangulated the source beam to estimate
the SSL’s location.  See 2001 BiOp at 135, cited in Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors in Opposition to Plain-
tiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Greenpeace IV at 40–41 n.16, and also dis-
cussion at 40–43 (No. C98-0492Z).
282. Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
283. Id. at 1194.
284. Id.
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Greenpeace claimed that telemetry data were not new and that
NMFS’ use of it to justify an expanded zone for fishing was arbi-
trary and capricious.285  The plaintiffs based this claim on Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.,286 where the Court held that “an agency changing its
course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analy-
sis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance.”287
Judge Zilly acknowledged that the agency was using new data
that did not necessarily require the reversal or rescission of previ-
ous considerations.288  He agreed with the agency that improve-
ments in data collection made possible “a more refined approach to
reviewing impacts on critical habitat,” and that the cumulative na-
ture of knowledge was significant.289  Although Judge Zilly deter-
mined that the zonal approach was built on analysis done previ-
ously by NMFS and was not a radical departure from past
approaches, the judge took a different view of the way the agency
treated biases in the data.
Both sources of bias in the telemetry data were products of the
method itself.  First, the agency noted that although telemetry
pointed out the location of sampled SSL, it could only be inferred
that the SSL were foraging at those locations.290  The agency’s posi-
tion was that SSL could not forage where they were not present,
justifying separate treatment of near shore and offshore loca-
tions.291  Greenpeace challenged this assumption, arguing that it
was equally likely that all foraging took place outside the near
shore (0-10 nautical miles) zone, or that it occurred equally in each
zone.292  The court, however, agreed that the agency had used the
best science available and that there was no contrasting theory
demonstrating whether “there are areas of ocean, a time of day or
distance from land that is more or less important or effective for a
foraging Steller sea lion.”293
285. Id.
286. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
287. Id. at 42.
288. Greenpeace IV, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
289. Id. (emphasis added).  By noting that NMFS was refining the considera-
tions rather than “changing its course,” the court nullified the plaintiffs’ argument
that the changes were arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 1195–96.
290. Id. at 1196.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1196–97.
293. Id. at 1197 (quoting 2001 BiOp).
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The second instrument bias related to measurement of SSL
behavior.  Near shore, the SSL spend much time on the surface of
the water, where transmitters effectively send data.294  Offshore,
they engage in more deep diving, when transmitters do not func-
tion.295  In an effort to counter the likely near-shore bias of the data,
the agency filtered the data by “discounting 90% of at-sea locations
from the 0-2 nautical mile zone.”296  Then the agency concluded
that both filtered and unfiltered data revealed that the 0-3 and 3-10
nautical mile zones were most important to SSL “except for adults
in the winter and pups and juveniles in the summer.”297  Both
Greenpeace and Judge Zilly criticized the agency’s analysis using
these filtered data as not being rationally related to expert data on
the SSL distribution.298  Carefully distinguishing among data on
pups, juveniles, lactating females, and other adults, and distin-
guishing winter and summer records, the judge found that the 3-10
and 10-20 nautical mile zones were “of more or less equal foraging
importance for the most critical population segment.”299  For this
reason, the agency could not rationally distinguish the two zones by
allowing fishing in portions of the latter while prohibiting it in the
former (3-10 nautical miles).300  This led the judge to agree with
Greenpeace that the agency’s no jeopardy and no adverse modifi-
cation conclusions in the 2001 BiOp were arbitrary and capri-
cious.301
3. Challenge to Agency Analysis.  The third and final chal-
lenge by Greenpeace alleged a lack of analysis by NMFS of the ef-
fects of opening some portions of the 10-20 nautical mile zone to
fishing.302  The environmental organization asked why, in the 2001
BiOp, the agency did not answer the seven questions it had ad-
dressed in the fishery management plan BiOp.303  Such questions
evaluate whether the fisheries would adversely affect the SSL’s
critical habitat or jeopardize their survival, for example, by over-
lapping temporally and spatially.304  The court found that the
294. Id.
295. Id.  This creates a “bias in the data because of the nature of satellite te-
lemetry.”  Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. (quoting 2001 BiOp).
298. Id. at 1198-99.
299. Id. at 1198.
300. Id. at 1199.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1200.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1200 n.20.
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agency’s three-step inquiry305 satisfied ESA requirements as easily
as the earlier seven-question test.306  Further at issue, however, was
whether NMFS had evidence to support its no jeopardy and ad-
verse modification conclusions in the 2001 BiOp.307
The judge particularly noted Greenpeace’s argument that
fishing in the 10-20 nautical mile zone would have an impact on
SSL foraging near shore (called the “edge effect”), because prey
migrated across the zones.308  Judge Zilly reasoned that “[f]ishing
outside the forage zones may cause localized depletions within the
forage zones, which could then cause adverse modification of the
‘high’ importance areas of critical habitat and impact the Steller sea
lion.”309 The judge failed to find in the administrative record evi-
dence that allowing fishing in the 10-20 nautical mile zone would
not adversely affect the listed species and its habitat.310  Thus, by
not “articulat[ing] a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made,”311 the agency violated the ESA.312
4.  Summary.  The 2000 fishery management plan BiOp and
the 2001 BiOp provided justification for the continued operation of
the huge groundfish fishery in the North Pacific, however the
methods used and subsequent conclusions made failed to alleviate
concerns for the SSL’s lack of protection.  Judge Zilly had no diffi-
culty with the fishery management plan BiOp, which took a highly
conservative approach to fishery management in order to protect
the endangered SSL.  He acknowledged the agency’s expertise
when it produced new data and methods in the 2001 BiOp, which
created the zonal approach and allowed fishing in once prohibited
305. This three-step inquiry required NMFS to:
(1) Identify the probable direct and indirect effects of the pro-
posed action on the action area, (2) Determine whether reduc-
tions in Steller sea lion reproduction, numbers, or distribution
would reasonably be expected, and (3) Determine if any reduc-
tions in Steller sea lion reproduction, numbers, or distribution
could be expected to appreciably reduce the Steller sea lion’s
likelihood of surviving and recovering in the wild.
 Id. at 1201 n.21.
306. Id. at 1201.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1202 n.23.
309. Id. at 1203.
310. Id.
311. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir.
1985).
312. Greenpeace IV, 237 F.2d at 1204.
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areas.313  However, what concerned the court was NMFS’ failure to
consistently and rationally apply the new methods and its failure to
demonstrate in its record of decision-making that the new methods
and approaches would avoid jeopardy to the SSL and adverse
modification to its critical habitat.314  For these reasons, Judge Zilly
remanded the 2001 BiOp to NMFS to remedy the flaws highlighted
by Greenpeace IV.315  By mutual agreement of plaintiffs, defen-
dants, and intervenors, Judge Zilly concluded Greenpeace v. Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service on April 1, 2003, shortly before the
fifth anniversary of its filing.316
V.  CONCLUSION
This article has asked how decisions were made in the absence
of conclusive evidence on the causes of SSL decline.  It noted that
NMFS was not required by legislation to decide only when it pos-
sessed certain knowledge.  ESA only requires agencies to act based
on the “best scientific and commercial data available.”317  NMFS
contracts for the best information available on the Steller sea lion
and the North Pacific groundfish fishery. The Greenpeace chal-
lenges reveal a failure by the agency to analyze and rationally apply
the information it possessed.  The agency waited nearly three years
after it had recommended the reclassification of the western stock
of SSL as endangered before declaring, in BiOp 1, that the large
fisheries jeopardized and adversely modified the SSL’s critical
habitat.  Then the agency failed to develop reasonable and prudent
alternatives consistent with its own biological opinion and explain
why these conclusions avoided jeopardy for the SSL’s critical habi-
tat.  Under pressure of the court injunction, the agency produced a
satisfactory biological opinion (the fishery management plan BiOp
of 2000), which threatened the fishing industry.  Then, NMFS
nearly capitulated to the Council and industry by issuing the 2001
BiOp, which opened closed sections of the fishery without ex-
plaining why this did not jeopardize the listed species.  NMFS’ ac-
tions described a pattern of tardiness, equivocation, and inconsis-
tency, which prompted the Greenpeace challenges.
The court did not demand certainty from the agency.  It
pointed out that endangered species law tolerates uncertainty, but
it requires institutional caution and consistency in agency imple-
313. Id. at 1195.
314. Id. at 1199.
315. Id. at 1204.
316. Agreed Order at 2, Greenpeace IV (Civ. No. C98-0492Z).
317. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2002).
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mentation.  A careful reading of the dockets on the quartet of court
orders indicates that the court was willing to defer to the agency
when it mobilized its expertise to implement its charge of species
protection.  However, the court was unwilling to permit irresponsi-
bility and inconsistency.  Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries
Service did not establish new law through judicial interpretation of
NEPA and ESA.  Instead, it applied the pioneering statutes of the
American environmental movement to the complex issues of a
complex fishery.  By doing so, this case has established a precedent
that likely will be used to evaluate future challenges to biodiversity
in the North Pacific ecosystem.
